Guest Contributor
Discover how ransomware actors are using physical mail for extortion and what universities must do to enhance their cybersecurity response strategies.
A new ransomware threat tactic has emerged that bypasses traditional digital delivery methods—threat actors are now delivering extortion demands via the United States Postal Service, with ransom demands between $250,000 and $500,000. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service and FINRA have both issued warnings about these mailed threats, impersonating known ransomware groups and claiming to have compromised institutional networks. This evolution gives university cybersecurity leaders unique challenges, and they may need to update their incident response plans to address them.
According to recent research by Grayson North from GuidePoint Research and Intelligence Team, multiple organizations have received physical letters claiming to be from the BianLian ransomware group. The letters all follow a similar pattern: they claim the group compromised networks and stole data, giving a 10-day ultimatum before leaking sensitive information. While the trustworthiness of these specific claims remains unproven, the emergence of physical mail-based threats requires higher education institutions to adapt their security posture.
Detection methods for physical mail ransomware and digital ransomware are very different. With digital attacks, technical security tools can alert the cybersecurity team before a report from a user. Physical mail threats invert this process.
"The security team may not know of the physical mail-based attack until they're notified by the end user who receives it."
Justin Bettura, CISO at Youngstown State University.
This detection gap creates critical response delays.
Universities face additional complications because of their decentralized structure. Departments may not have protocols for reporting suspicious mail. Further complicating matters, departmental staff may not recognize physical mail as an indicator of potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities, so they may not think to notify the information security team if they receive an extortion letter.
A comprehensive incident response plan for physical ransomware threats should include several key components:
The information security team must devise measures to verify the veracity of the threats. When a physical letter claims attackers have compromised systems and data, IT security teams should analyze network traffic for unusual activity, scan systems for malware, review audit logs for unauthorized access, and perform forensic imaging of potentially affected systems.
Perhaps most importantly, institutions should establish a clear communication plan to inform key stakeholders while preventing unnecessary panic. Following the incident, a thorough review should examine opportunities to improve policies, enhance training, and strengthen security awareness.
Universities must balance thorough investigation while avoiding campus-wide alarm. Security teams should evaluate the letter for indicators of a hoax, engage forensics analysis teams, and collaborate with law enforcement partners.
Communication should remain tightly controlled, limiting awareness to key officials until the team can verify the potential threat. If evidence confirms the threat, the team can activate established breach response protocols. If the investigation determines the threat is a hoax, document the incident without triggering unnecessary campus-wide communications.
This measured approach maintains operational continuity and ensures that threats receive appropriate levels of attention. This delicate balance is especially crucial in academic settings, where disruptions can affect thousands of students and faculty.
When researching specific threat actors like the BianLian ransomware group, universities should rely on trusted cybersecurity sources, including government advisories, threat intelligence firms, and law enforcement. Incident response teams should avoid direct engagement with potential threat actors.
Trained cybersecurity personnel should conduct all research in secure environments to prevent triggering further threats. Access to findings should remain restricted to key stakeholders to maintain operational security and prevent misinformation from spreading across campus.
Universities should incorporate specific tabletop exercises that simulate physical ransomware scenarios. These might include receiving an extortion letter, handling a suspicious package potentially containing malware, or coordinating multi-departmental response efforts.
Effective exercises will assess mailroom security protocols, escalation procedures, coordination with law enforcement, and communication strategies. They should also evaluate the collaboration between IT and law enforcement teams in detecting and containing cyber threats that may be associated with physical components.
These simulations help identify gaps in response capabilities before a real incident occurs and build muscle memory for cross-functional teams that may not regularly work together.
The collaborative nature of higher education provides a natural advantage when dealing with emerging threats. Universities can leverage relationships with peer institutions through trusted networks such as the REN-ISAC higher education cybersecurity consortium to share intelligence on physical ransomware threats securely and discreetly.
Regular confidential updates through established channels allow for information exchange without creating unnecessary alarm. This enables institutions to implement preventative measures based on shared insights before being targeted themselves.
Clear communication guidelines should govern these exchanges to ensure sensitive information remains protected while still benefiting the broader higher education community.
Preparing communication templates in advance ensures consistent, measured messaging during high-stress situations. Universities should develop templates for different audiences: internal notifications for staff, faculty, and students; external alerts for parents, media, and the public; and updates for law enforcement or oversight bodies.
These templates should feature clear, calm language that emphasizes specific response steps and designated points of contact, while avoiding speculation. A consistent framework ensures messaging remains coordinated and controlled, with designated responsibilities for communication at each stage of the incident.
To better respond to hybrid physical-digital threats, universities should strengthen specific cybersecurity capabilities, including intelligence gathering, user awareness training, and incident response processes. These elements form the foundation of a resilient security program capable of addressing unconventional threats that cross the boundary between physical and digital domains. By proactively building these capabilities, institutions can respond more effectively regardless of the delivery method attackers choose.
The emergence of physical mail-based ransomware threats reminds us that cybersecurity extends beyond network perimeters. Higher education institutions must develop holistic security approaches that integrate physical and digital protection strategies.
Universities that adopt comprehensive security frameworks, conduct regular cross-functional training, and take part in collaborative information sharing will better address these evolving threats. By treating unusual attack vectors as an expected part of the threat landscape rather than anomalies, institutions can build resilient security programs.
As threat actors continue to innovate, the ability to adapt security approaches will distinguish adequately protected institutions from vulnerable ones. University leaders must consider not only what threats come through their networks but also what threats might arrive at their mailrooms.
Guest Contributor
Justin Bettura is the Chief Information Security Officer at Youngstown State University. CampusCISO is grateful to feature guest contributors who bring real-world perspectives from the higher education cybersecurity community.
